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7 Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination 
Processes in Cases of Domestic Violence 
Donna Coker 
Stopping domestic violence is hard work. Domestic violence is a social 
practice maintained by multiple systems that operate in the lives of bat-
tering men and battered women. For men in subordinated communi-
ties, social inequalities related to race, poverty, and Indigenous status, 
for example, operate in complex ways that are related to a man's choice 
to use violence, though none is its single definitive 'cause'. The same 
intersecting oppressive systems operate in women's lives. For example, 
poverty increases women's vulnerability to battering and limits their 
ability to escape violence; violence increases women's vulnerability to 
poverty. 
This chapter attempts to further the dialogue between restorative jus-
tice activists and scholars and feminist anti-domestic violence activists 
and scholars. My focus is on the struggle against domestic violence in 
subordinated communities. My aim is to address the need for justice 
strategies that account for the intersecting oppressive systems that oper-
ate in the lives of battering men and battered women who are members 
of these communities. 
My discussion draws on theory and practice of both the feminist 
movement against domestic violence and the restorative justice move-
ment. Feminist theory provides critical insights regarding the dangers of 
reliance on private mechanisms of control, the causes of male violence 
against women, the necessity of engaging the state on.behalf of women, 
and the conflicting and ambiguous nature of that state intervention. 
Restorative justice theory offers critical insights regarding the way 
offenders' experiences with the criminal justice system influence their 
likelihood of reoffending, the importance of providing victims the 
opportunity to be active agents in developing responses to crime, and 
the importance of social networks of family and friends both in provid-
ing restraints against crime and in caring for victims of crime. I hope to 
lay the groundwork for a dialogue between feminist theorists working 
against domestic violence and restorative justice theorists. Building on 
the insights of both fields will enrich anti-domestic violence theory and 
practice. 
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I begin with a critique of the feminist analysis of liberalism's pub-
lic/private distinction as it relates to anti-domestic violence work. 
Feminist efforts to construct domestic violence as a public issue rather 
than a private problem have been critical for gaining women's access to 
public resources, including criminal justice resources. But the discourse 
that constructs domestic violence as a public issue is subject to co-
optation in ways that increase state control of poor women and women 
of colour. The critical dilemma for feminists who seek to empower bat-
tered women is to develop strategies for controlling the criminal justice 
system without increasing state control of women. 
Restorative justice processes, on the other hand, threaten to re-
privatize domestic violence in ways that are harmful to women. Feminist 
critics have warned of the dangers of restorative justice processes that 
privilege family and community forms of intervention, noting that fam-
ily and community are often unwilling or unable to oppose domestic 
violence (Goel, 2000; Hooper & Busch, 1996; Stubbs, 1995; Stubbs, 
this volume). Indeed, family and community are often the primary sup-
ports for male control of women. I share these concerns of feminist crit-
ics, but I focus on a second manner in which restorative justice 
processes may be said to be 'privatizing'. The restorative justice critique 
of punitive criminal justice responses emphasizes the power of the state 
to do harm (Braithwaite, 1989), yet restorative justice proponents often 
construct the state as a distant and largely irrelevant party (Hudson & 
Gal away, 1996). This construction of the state elides state power and 
naturalizes state created crime categories and the operation of state 
crime control systems. Thus, restorative justice processes threaten to 
create a deeply privatized criminal justice process. 
I identify two additional serious theoretical weaknesses of restorative 
justice theory as applied to domestic violence cases. First, it offers no 
clear principles for dealing with crimes, such as domestic violence, 
where majoritarian opposition to the crime is weak or compromised. 
Second, restorative justice theory under-theorizes criminal offending, 
generally, providing little foundation for a theory of male violence 
against women. 
These weaknesses can be addressed by current feminist theory, criti-
cal race feminist theory, social science research regarding domestic vio-
lence, and the theoretical underpinnings of programs for men who 
batter. Incorporating insights from these theoretical and empirical 
sources can enable restorative justice theory to effectively address the 
complicated problem of domestic violence. 
Finally, I call for anti-subordination processes that address the inter-
secting oppressive systems that operate in the lives of men and women 
in subordinated communities. These anti-subordination processes 
130 Donna Coker 
should seek to transform private relationships - the social networks that 
reinforce and support a batterer's controlling behaviour as well as the 
social networks that can assist battered women. A process that attempts 
to animate family and community to intervene against domestic vio-
lence need not result in re-privatizing domestic violence, provided the 
process seeks to transform the norms of family and community mem-
bers, rather than rely on existing anti-battering norms that may be weak 
or contradictory. A focus on race and class subordination need not 
excuse domestic violence, provided that battering men are encouraged 
to connect their own experiences of subordination with their sub-
ordination of women. 
In developing these processes I draw on Ruth Morris's concept of 
transformative justice (Morris, 1994, 1995). I expand Morris's model to 
include concepts from innovative programs, including batterers' treat-
ment programs, that link a critical analysis of the racist, sexist, and 
classist practices of the criminal justice system with offender accounta-
bility to victims and communities. A process that incorporates insights 
from feminist and critical race feminist theory as well as restorative jus-
tice theory offers battered women and battering men the possibility of 
transforming communities as well as interpersonal relationships. 
The Dilemma of Privacy: Battering as a Public Issue 
The controversy about nation-wide implementation of mandatory arrest poli-
cies reflects the ambivalence with which feminists regard the police. On one 
hand, battered women's advocates want to hold the police accountable, as 
agents of the state, for carrying out the government's mandate to protect citi-
zens. On the other hand, feminists realize that police often exercise their power 
in ways that reinforce the disadvantages already experienced by women, and in 
ways that reinforce the disadvantages experienced by members of poor and 
minority communities as well. (Sparks, 1997: 35-36) 
Feminist challenges to the liberal distinction between the public realm 
of the state and market and the private realm of family and community 
have long been central to anti-domestic violence activism (Goldfarb, 
2000; Schneider, 1991). In contrast to concepts ofthe family as a haven 
that fosters personal development and civic engagement, feminists have 
documented the extent to which families are sites of domestic tyranny 
marked by violence and coercion (Bartlett, 1999; Kelly, 1996). 
Feminists have further exposed the manner in which public/private 
ideology hides state action by making patriarchal families appear natu-
ral and inevitable (Fineman, 1995). Both positive law and the absence 
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of law create family structures of dominance (Fenton, 1999; Miccio, 
2000; Minow, 1990; Taub & Schneider, 1990). Constructing domestic 
violence as a public issue exposes the state's collusion with batterers, 
underscores the seriousness of the violence, and emphasizes battering as 
a civil rights issue. 
By contrast, restorative justice scholarship presumes a largely unprob-
lematized distinction between public and private life. Dominant meth-
ods of criminal processing are said to 'steal' the conflict from the parties 
(Braithwaite, 1999). As compared to state actors, community and fam-
ily members are presumed to have a greater stake in responding to crime 
and to be better able to meet the needs of victims. 
A number of feminist scholars have raised concerns about the priva-
tizing potential of restorative justice processes (Busch, this volume; 
Hooper & Busch, 1996; Stubbs, 1995; Stubbs, this volume). When 
applied to domestic violence cases, reliance on mechanisms of the pri-
vate realms of family and community threatens to reverse progress by 
pushing domestic violence back into the realm of the 'private' (Hooper 
& Busch, 1996; Stubbs, this volume). 
Feminist critics also worry that processes like conferencing will 
'domesticate' the violence (Cobb, 1997), couching it as mere conflict or 
as centred in unique relationship dynamics rather than as the result of 
the batterer's struggle to dominate his partner (Hooper & Busch, 1996; 
Stubbs, this volume). In addition, some feminist scholars are concerned 
that the moral educative function of criminalization may be lost when 
restorative justice processes replace retributive processes (see Daly, this 
volume). Public punishment marks the violence as serious and 'send[s] 
a clear social message that battering is impermissible' (Schneider, 1991: 
989).1 
The dilemma of privacy: limits of the public/private analysis 
These critiques of the public/private distinction have been important to 
organizing public opposition against domestic violence, but feminists 
have paid too little attention to the dangers of a focus on making domes-
tic violence a public problem. The feminist critique ofthe public/private 
distinction is an important but incomplete analysis of the relationship 
between battered women and the state. It is inaccurate to describe the 
state's response to domestic violence as a unified refusal to intervene in 
'private' family matters. Race and class mark the history of the state's 
relationship to families in general, and to domestic violence, in particu-
lar (Gordon, 1988; Roberts, 1999; Siegel, 1996). As Riva Siegel's histo-
ry of US law demonstrates, notions of family privacy eventually gave 
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way to class and race based notions of white middle-class superiority 
(Siegel, 1996). By the end of the nineteenth century harsh penalties 
such as whipping were proposed for wife beaters who were character-
ized as 'lawless or unruly men of the "dangerous classes'" (Siegel, 1996: 
2139). These 'dangerous classes' referred primarily to African-American 
and low-status immigrant men (Siegel, 1996). Linda Gordon's history 
of a child-saving organization in Boston similarly demonstrates that 
there was little objection to state intervention when family violence was 
understood as a problem of poor immigrant families (Gordon, 1988). 
The racist and classist beliefs of state actors may support intervention 
as well as non-intervention, but neither choice derives from beliefs 
about protecting family privacy. For example, the practice of police to 
refuse to intervene when violence is 'horizontal' - e.g., involving two 
persons of similar (and devalued) race and/or class (Ferraro, 1989; 
Hampton, 1987) better explains police refusal to assist battered women 
of colour than does their desire to guard family privacy (Ferraro, 1989). 
Further problematizing an emphasis on domestic violence as a public 
problem is the fact that the lives of poor women and women of colour 
are often under-privatized (Fineman, 1995; Roberts, 1995; Roberts, 
1999). In other words, women need privacy (Roberts, 1999; Schneider, 
1991). US women who receive government assistance have little pro-
tection from state intrusion (Roberts, 1995). Families headed by single 
mothers are deemed suspect and 'may be thought of as "public" fami-
lies, not entitled to privacy' (Fineman, 1995: 178). Suspicion about the 
mothering abilities of poor women and particularly of poor African-
American women results in disproportionate numbers of their children 
in the US foster care system (Roberts, 1995).2 The massive removal of 
Indigenous children by the governments of Australia, the US, and 
Canada eloquently demonstrates the way in which an ideal of family 
privacy has little relevance for the description of relations between the 
state and families in subordinated communities (Australia Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997; Kline, 1992; Indian 
Child Welfare Act of 1978). 
In addition to state control of women as mothers, US women of 
colour and particularly African-American women who live in urban 
cores are subjected to significant invasions of privacy incidental to the 
'war on drugs', renamed by some the 'war on poor people' (Bush-
Baskette, 1998). This war is largely responsible for increases in the 
numbers of women in prison (Chesney-Lind, 1998) and the extraordi-
nary increases in the numbers of imprisoned African-American women 
(Bush-Baskette, 1998). 
The ways in which the state operates to control and disempower poor 
women and women of colour illustrates the value of restorative justice 
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concerns with the state 'stealing conflict' from the community. Given a 
choice between the privatizing problems of community control versus 
the oppressive intervention of the state, some women will choose the 
former. 
'Tough on crime' and domestic violence 
Women's lives are subject to 'interlocking' (Fellows & Razack, 1998) 
and 'intersecting' (Crenshaw, 1991) sites for potential subordination. 
This reality shapes the effects and meaning of domestic violence inter-
vention strategies. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that feminist 
discourse that regards domestic violence as a public issue is subject to 
cooptation. The language of public issue has been adopted by those 
whose agenda, unlike that of feminists, is not focussed on empowering 
women. If the 'problem belongs to the public, then individual women's 
desires need not be central to policy development (Mills, 1999). 
Further, given the trend in many countries, and especially the US, to 
enact increasingly harsh control and surveillance methods for dealing 
with social problems (Browne, 1995; Caplow & Simon, 1999; Fellows 
& Razack, 1998), domestic violence as a public problem has largely 
come to mean domestic violence as a crime control problem (Currie, 
1993). Zero tolerance arrest policies and no-drop prosecution are pop-
ular in no small part because they resonate with this emphasis on pun-
ishment and control (Coker, 2001; Martin, 1998; Snider, 1998). 
The dilemma for using the criminal justice system to empower 
battered women is to develop strategies for controlling state actors -
ensuring that the police come when called and that prosecutors do not 
trivialize cases - without increasing state control of women. It is the 
dilemma of making domestic violence a public responsibility in the con-
text of racist and classist public systems. 
Aggressive crime enforcement policies that mandate arrest and 
require prosecutors to pursue domestic violence cases, ~ven when vic-
tims are opposed to arrest and prosecution, are central to much of fem-
inist law reform in the US, England, Canada, and Australia (Dobash & 
Dobash, 1999a). A primary reason for feminist support of these policies 
is that they increase the likelihood that police and prosecutors will act 
to protect women rather than trivialize or ignore their complaints 
(Stark, 1996).3 For years, the problem with police intervention for US 
battered women of colour and Indigenous women was a problem of 
police refusal to intervene. Loretta Kelly (this volume) documents sim-
ilar problems with police refusal to assist Aboriginal women in 
Australia. Thus, work to ensure that police respond when they are called 
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and that they protect women when they arrive is central to justice for 
battered women. But mandatory policies such as no-drop prosecution 
and zero tolerance policing increase the potential for state interference 
and control in women's lives. This is particularly true for poor women 
and women of colour (Espenoza, 1999; Mills, 1999). As a direct result 
of these arrest policies, for example, more women are arrested for 
domestic violence (Hamberger & Potente, 1994; Zorza & Woods, 1994). 
Strong anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the women arrested are 
victims of battering who are acting in self-defence or who are respond-
ing to a pattern of abuse (Zorza, 1994; Hamberger & Potente, 1994). In 
addition to arrests for domestic violence, aggressive criminal inter-
ventions also threaten increased state control for those battered women 
involved in (other) criminal activity. Women's involvement in illegal 
drug activity and prostitution is often directly related to being in an abu-
sive relationship (Daly, 1994; Richie, 1996). As noted earlier, the dan-
ger of identification, arrest, and conviction is much higher for women of 
colour and particularly African-American women who live in heavily 
policed 'drug zones'. In addition, domestic violence arrest mandates 
may aggravate racist and abusive police behaviours (Kelly, 1999; Rivera, 
1994; Snider, 1998). 
Zero tolerance arrest policies also create collateral harms for women. 
If a battered woman is arrested for domestic violence she may lose the 
protection afforded by special domestic violence legislation. For exam-
ple, evidence of her arrest, even if she is not charged, may prevent her 
from benefiting from child custody laws that disfavour a violent parent 
(see, e.g., Florida Statute 61.30,2000). In addition, police intervention 
and sustained prosecutorial presence increase state control of women 
through child protection monitoring (Pennell & Burford, this volume). 
In the US, many child protection agencies treat a child's residence in a 
home where domestic violence takes place as child abuse, even when the 
child was not present at the time the abuse took place (Nicholson v. 
Williams; Sengp.pta, 2000). Children are removed from the home and 
the mother's parenting is more broadly investigated (S. Dougan, attor-
ney, personal communication, 1999). If both parents are arrested, chil-
dren may be placed in temporary foster care. 
In addition to these direct and collateral harms, the practice of deny-
ing women any voice in the criminal processing of intimates (or former 
intimates) raises questions regarding the legitimate role of battered 
women's agency (Mills, 1999; Minow, 2000).4 These policies limit 
women's ability to negotiate the terrain between state control and pri-
vate control (Ford, 1991; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Kendrick, 1998). 
Women, and in the US especially low-income African-American 
women, rely on the police to interrupt and prevent battering episodes 
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(Buzawa et aI, 1999; Hutchinson & Hirschel, 1998). This does not nec-
essarily mean that they seek prosecution and punishment. Some women 
clearly do, but others use the threat of prosecution to gain key conces-
sions from the batterer. This kind of bargaining becomes impossible in 
jurisdictions with no-drop prosecution policies (Ford, 1991; Wittner, 
1998) . 
In addition, mandatory criminal interventions reinforce pathological 
notions of battered women who do not want to assist prosecution and 
who do not want to separate from a partner who abuses them. As 
Martha Mahoney explains, women's 'failure' to separate is often under-
stood as evidence that a battered woman is crazy, lying about the sever-
ity of the abuse, or both (Mahoney, 1991). 'Staying' is a socially suspect 
choice - often perceived as acceptance of violence ... ' (Mahoney, 1994: 
60). As Julia Perilla notes, 'a failure to leave the relationship is seen by 
many ... court systems as a woman's failure to do something for herself 
and her family' (Perilla, 1999: 124). 
Thus, legal professionals in reform institutions in the US - judges 
who routinely hear protection order or misdemeanour battering cases, 
court personnel hired to work with battered women, prosecutors, police 
officers, probation officers, and court clerks - presume that women 
should separate for their safety (Coker, 2000; Fenton, 1999; Wittner, 
1998). In fact, some actors refuse to assist women whom they do not 
view as serious about leaving their abusers. This problem is not unique 
to the US. Loretta Kelly (1999) similarly notes that Australian police 
sometimes refuse to assist Aboriginal women who make repeat police 
calls because they believe the women are uninterested in separating 
from their abuser. 
Not only does this separation-focus 'devalue women's connections 
with their partner[s], (Coker, 2000: 1019), it is based on the false prem-
ise that separation equates with safety. In fact, for some women separa-
tion increases their risk of death or serious assault (Mahoney, 1991). 
Further, the safety that follows separation is largely fictive for poor 
women who do not have the resources to relocate. If these women 'have 
managed to find low-cost or public housing in the inner city and to 
patch together support systems or social services which allow them to 
care for their children, they have no alternative but to remain there as 
sitting ducks for the abuser when he returns' (Bowman, 1992: 205).5 
These are (some of) the harms of mandatory criminal interventions. 
However, this is only part of the story. 'The outcome of policing, and of 
criminal justice intervention more generally is likely to be varied, per-
haps contradictory, and in part determined by context' (Stubbs, 1995: 
262). This is true both because women's lives differ from each other in 
important respects, and because the implementation and consequences 
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of criminal justice intervention policies differ from one location to the 
next. 6 These variances are shaped by conditions such as the nature of 
support services for battered women, the attitude of local law enforce-
ment officers, the availability of programs for men who batter, the 
nature of the relationship between the police force and communities of 
colour, and the influence of the local battered women's movement 
(Coker, 2000; Pence & McDonnell, 1999). While the crime control 
agenda shapes feminist discourse, criminal justice systems are also 
shaped by feminist demands that '[r]edefin[e] the purpose of the system 
[by] ... attempt[ing] to shift its primary orientation from that of carry-
ing out an abstract standard of justice to one of providing protection 
and resources ... [for battered women]' (Sparks, 1997: 36). 
Feminists have long been aware of the ambiguous nature of their 
efforts to harness the power of the state for the good of battered women 
(Schechter, 1982). The results are varied and the impact is shaped by 
the different material and cultural positions of women. Women's posi-
tions are shaped in part by dominant ideologies that inform the avail-
ability and the nature of public resources. Battered women cannot 
afford over-privatized remedies that result in their inability to invoke 
state power for protection, nor can they afford remedies that give them 
no control while presuming to act in the public's best interest. 
Three Theoretical Weaknesses of Restorative Justice 
Theory for Addressing Domestic Violence 
Restorative justice proponents, for the most part, do not recognize this 
ambiguous relationship with state power. Categorical statements in 
restorative justice literature that presume sharp distinctions between 
criminal justice policies that are 'punitive' versus those that are 'restora-
tive' fail to capture this varied reality (Daly, this volume) as does schol-
arship that depicts a singular victim and offender experience. 
Courtrooms may sometimes be 'nightmares' (Martin, 1998) for bat-
tered women, but sometimes women feel validated and empowered by 
court processes (Ptacek, 1999; Wittner, 1998). Arrest may cause some 
abusers to feel shame or rage or both (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994), but 
this experience may be moderated by subsequent respectful though firm 
treatment from the court (Ptacek, 1999) and treatment programs. Most 
men arrested for domestic violence misdemeanours serve little or no 
time in jail (Fields, 1994; Karan, 1999; Salzman, 1994) and many in the 
US and Canada are ordered to attend batterers' treatment programs 
(Dobash & Dobash, 1999a). 
It is critical to engage the state on behalf of battered women, but we 
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must do so in ways that are sufficiently protective of poor women and 
women of colour. Three theoretical weaknesses of restorative justice 
theory for use in domestic violence cases hinder its ability to provide this 
kind of protection. 
Naturalizing state power: restorative justice and a theory of the 
state 
We need to address the harder and more complex questions about how justice 
system practices are saturated and marked by racial-ethnic (and other) divi-
sions, both past and present. (Daly, 2000b: 182) 
The first weakness of restorative justice theory for dealing with domes-
tic violence in subordinated communities is the manner in which 
restorative justice theorists often construct the state as a distant actor 
and thus elide the way state power suffuses all criminal justice process-
es, including restorative justice processes. I raise this concern not to 
argue for the superiority of formal justice processes - indeed, formal 
processes are clearly engaged in the same practices - but rather to argue 
for the modification of restorative justice processes. 
Restorative justice scholars understand crime to be 'primarily ... a 
conflict between individuals that results in injuries to victims, commu-
nities, and the offenders ... ' (Hudson & Galaway, 1996: 2). In restora-
tive justice processes 'all the parties with a stake in a particular offence 
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of 
the offence and its implications for the future' (Braithwaite, 1999a: 5 
(quotingT. Marshall, 1997, personal communication)). Thus restorative 
justice theorists construct the state as a distant or even irrelevant actor 
to restorative processes. The result is to elide the operation of state 
power that suffuses the processing of criminal cases. The legislature 
determines how crimes are defined and state actors within the criminal 
justice system determine how these laws are applied, to whom, and 
under what circumstances. 
As some restorative justice writers have noted, the criminal justice 
system may not be the most likely arena for efforts to achieve large 
measures of social justice (Braithwaite, 1999a; Daly, 2000b). For exam-
ple, John Braithwaite (l999a: 105) writes that the most important reme-
dies for controlling crime 'are not reforms to the justice system' but 
rather 'reforms about liberty, equality, and community in more deeply 
structural and developmental senses'. The difficulty with this response 
is that restorative justice processes do more than simply fail to address 
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the possible range of social injustices. They legitimate state power 
through reinforcing the behavioural norms reflected in the laws and 
through naturalizing the justice practices that bring the offender to the 
attention of the restorative process. 
This legitimizing function illustrates a fundamental tension of 
restorative justice processes and the use of John Braithwaite's (1989) 
concepts of reintegrative shaming in those processes. (Perhaps, instead, 
it illustrates the inevitable tensions in partial reform.) A critical insight 
of Braithwaite's work (1989) (and restorative justice work more gener-
ally) is that an offender's experience of criminal justice processes may 
encourage future offending. Braithwaite (1989: 55) distinguishes 
between disintegrative (stigmatizing) shaming and reintegrative sham-
ing. Reintegrative shaming involves 'expressions of community disap-
proval ... followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community of 
law-abiding citizens' (Braithwaite, 1989: 55). Braithwaite argues further 
that 'shame is more deterring when administered by persons who con-
tinue to be of importance to us; when we become outcasts we can reject 
our rejectors and the shame no longer matters to us' (Braithwaite, 1989: 
55). In his later work on restorative justice, Braithwaite refers to the use 
of 'communities of care' composed of individuals who care about the 
offender, to provide reintegrative shaming in restorative processes such 
as conferencing (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994: 194). 
Thus, reintegrative shaming requires that private individuals agree 
with and support the moral norms reflected in the penal laws 
(Braithwaite, 1989). It also requires that private individuals (implicitly, 
at least) acknowledge the moral authority of the state to create and 
enforce those norms. In essence, restorative justice and reintegrative 
shaming require an alliance between the state and 'communities of 
care'. Given the way in which crime policy is used to control poor peo-
ple and people of colour, given the racist and classist practices of crim-
inal justice officers, and given the way in which significant numbers of 
poor people and people of colour are locked out of electoral politics, 
establishing an alliance between the norms of an offender's community 
of care and those of the criminal justice system asks a great deal of sub-
ordinated communities. Further, unlike some community-police 
alliances (Kahan, 1999; Meares, 1997), this alliance does not offer sub-
ordinated people much in the way of control of the ongoing operation 
of the criminal justice system in their community. As Kathleen Daly 
(2000b: 174) argues, restorative justice 'must be tied to a political 
process [that includes] a process of engagement among and between the 
interests of political minority groups (for example, indigenous and fem-
inist) and governments'. In other words, restorative justice must engage 
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with political action directed at state inequalities; it must engage the 
state, rather than ignore the state. 
Restorative justice theory and the lack of majoritarian opposition 
to domestic violence 
The struggle to construct the meaning of domestic violence is no less 
present in 'communities' than it is in the larger society. The most impor-
tant questions for thinking about the use of restorative justice processes 
in domestic violence cases are 'who defines the problem?' and 'how will 
the problem be constructed?' If community is, as Liz Kelly writes, the 
result of struggle and conflict over its identity (Kelly, 1996), then 
processes that are said to enact community norms cannot help but enter 
into that struggle. 'Community' practice cannot be neutral. 
John Braithwaite argues that reintegrative shaming, of the kind pro-
posed by some restorative justice advocates, requires that the law in 
question 'represent a clearly majoritarian morality' (Braithwaite, 1989: 
14), but as Braithwaite and Daly note, '[f]ew societies ... contain a 
majoritarian masculinity that sets its face against violence' (Braithwaite 
& Daly, 1994: 190). Polls that show significant opposition to domestic 
violence are promising (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994; Klein et aI, 1997), 
but such research does not capture the degree to which people are sym-
pathetic to the 'the hapless man who must defend against a nagging, 
shrewish woman' (Coker, 1992: 110) or the cuckold husband who must 
defend his honour (Coker, 1992). Additionally, people often fail to con-
demn non-violent controlling behaviours such as threats to take chil-
dren, control of money, isolation of the woman, and extreme jealousy 
(Pence & Paymar, 1993). 
The question of the norms that will apply is even more complicated 
for restorative justice processes like conferencing that rely on family and 
supporters. In conferencing, the victim, offender, facilitator, and sup-
porters of both the victim and the offender meet to discuss the crime 
and to develop a resolution that focuses on repairing the harm done to 
the victim. Thus, with conferencing, the relevant question becomes not 
what do most people believe, but rather what do significant people in the 
batterer)s (and the victim)s) life believe? Research with men who batter 
finds that friends and family often play important roles in supporting 
the batterer's view of himself as a victim rather than a victimizer 
(Bowker, 1983; DeKeseredy, 1990; Hearn, 1998a, 1998b). Jeff Hearn's 
in-depth interviews with abusive men found that their level of violence 
was positively correlated with both social isolation (few people with 
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whom to talk over problems or socialize) and with having friends who 
tacitly or explicitly endorse their violence. Hearn concludes that' [i] t is 
likely to be the nature of men's contact with his friends rather than the 
volume as such that is most significant [in determining his level of vio-
lence]' (Hearn, 1998b: 151, emphasis added).? And what was the nature 
of this contact? Hearn found that most male friends either said nothing 
or actively supported the man's use of violence (Hearn, 1998b). For 
example, a man who stabbed his wife reported the following responses 
from his friends: 
'What you've done, you've done something wrong, yes. And any man would 
have done something more or less similar, maybe not the same thing, or maybe 
not even anything related, but they would have fought for their children, sort of 
thing'. They said, 'And when children are involved in any sort of relationship or 
a man and a woman argument, it's a case of domestic and anything can happen.' 
(Hearn, 1998b: 154) 
Whether because of familial loyalty, their own experiences with denying 
or excusing family violence (Gayford, 1983), or because they fear the 
abuser (Pennell & Burford, this volume), family members are also 
unlikely to actively oppose the batterer's violence (Hearn, 1998b). One 
man's report provides an example: 
Q: Did any of your family or any of your friends know about the violence? 
A: Two of my brothers knew. You know, they was blaming me for it, but they 
know different now. They've read everything what she's put down in statements 
and they know now that 99 per cent she started it. (Hearn, 1998b: 152-53) 
In addition to micro-environments of family and male friends, the 
neighbourhood in which a batterer lives may shape his violence. 
Evidence suggests that men who live in the most intensely marginalized 
communities are the least likely to be deterred by arrest and criminal 
processing and their violence may escalate following arrest (Marciniak, 
1994).8 
The. responses to offending that develop from restorative justice 
processes such as conferencing reflect the understanding of the causes 
of the criminal offence shared by those who attend the process. Thus the 
result is captured, somewhat, by the limits of the group's understanding. 
John Braithwaite's description of drunk driving conferences provides an 
example: 
I have seen many drunk-driving conferences where the offender is a tottering 
alcoholic, but where no one in the community of care raises the need for a drug 
Anti-subordination processes in domestic violence 141 
treatment program, sometimes because most supporters are also excessive 
drinkers. (Braithwaite, 1999: 69) 
While members of the offender's support network may be willing to 
express (and even act on) opposition to the offender's driving while 
intoxicated, they are unlikely and unwilling to confront the root of his 
problem - his alcoholism. Similarly, without a process that deals with 
the beliefs and controlling behaviours that accompany domestic vio-
lence, conference attendees are likely to focus their attention solely on 
stopping the violence. The result is as likely to be encouraging the vic-
tim to appease the batterer by complying with his demands, as it is to 
support the woman's demands for autonomy. 
Theorizing about domestic violence 
I recognize that the violence was all about power, about wanting, I had to have 
my way, and by any means I would get my way. And usually the quickest means 
was violence. At the same time I always used to think that I never got my own 
[way] but in effect I did. I always got my own way ... (Hearn, 1998b: 170) 
Restorative justice literature concerns itself more with the relationship 
of the justice response to further criminal offending than with the nature 
of offending, per se (Braithwaite, 1989). This under-theorizing of offend-
ing is a significant theoretical weakness for the use of restorative justice 
processes in domestic violence cases. 9 
Feminist work in domestic violence understands the violence as 'a 
way of "doing power'" in a relationship (Mahoney, 1991: 53 quoting 
Stets, J, 1988). Feminist criminology suggests that it is also a way of 
'doing masculinity' (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994; Newburn & Stanko, 
1994). Domestic violence is understood not as an eruption that follows 
'conflict', but rather as part of a system of controlling behaviour. This is 
why reform systems require that battering men enrol in batterers' treat-
ment programs that address a range of controlling behaviours that make 
up a battering system (Adams, 1988; Edleson & Tolman, 1992; Pence & 
Paymar, 1993). An emphasis on conflict resolution hides the struggle for 
control and the feelings of male entitlement that often create the con-
text for 'conflict' (Dobash & Dobash, 1998; Fischer, Vidmar & Ellis, 
1993). 
Men who batter frequently describe themselves as victims (Coker, 
1992). They equate women's verbal aggression or threats to separate 
with a physical assault requiring a physical response (Coker, 1992). A 
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batterer's belief in his status as a victim is often tied to gendered con-
ceptions of appropriate behaviour for his female partner. Her failure to 
prioritize his needs, her failure to make herself available sexually, or her 
failure to control the children are felt as attacks on masculinity and pro-
vide a rationale for violence (Dobash & Dobash, 1998). As described in 
the previous section, these beliefs find much support both within the 
larger culture (Mahoney, 1991) and within the micro-cultures in which 
the batterer operates (Bowker, 1983). 
Lee Bowker argues that interventions with men who batter must be 
'multidimensional' in order to address the multiple systems roots of 
masculine violence (Bowker, 1998). Those who urge an ecological 
approach to understanding battering make a similar argument (Dutton, 
1995; Edleson & Tolman, 1992). This requires understanding the inter-
active links to battering that occur at the social, cultural, personality, 
biological, and economic system level (Bowker, 1998). 
Part of this systems approach is to recognize the ways in which men 
construct masculinity and the relevance of that construction to violence 
directed at women. As Angela Harris writes, when men use violence or 
threaten violence it may be 'an affirmative way of proving individual or 
collective masculinity, or in desperation when they perceive their 
masculine self-identity to be under attack' (Harris, 2000: 781). Under-
standing the manner in which masculinities are shaped by race, class 
and ethnic identities and experiences may be central to successful inter-
vention against battering. More privileged men are often better 
equipped to make their partner appear at fault (Waits, 1998). For 
example, when women leave, these men have the means to carry out 
protracted litigation that drains the woman's financial resources (Waits, 
1998) . 
As Harris notes, men who are denied access to dominant forms of 
idealized masculinity because of hierarchies of race, class, or sexual ori-
entation may create oppositional definitions of masculinity that are 
nonetheless shaped by the dominant model. For example, '[b] uilding on 
and subverting racist stereotypes, working-class and poor black men 
may aspire to a masculinity that emphasizes physical strength, mental 
control, and sexual prowess' (Harris, 2000: 784). Others may develop a 
form of 'hypermasculinity' which rests on 'exaggerated exhibition[s] of 
physical strength and personal aggression' (Harris, 2000: 785). 
Battering is not only the product of the operation of systems in the 
batterer's life (Edleson & Tolman, 1992), it is also shaped by structural 
inequalities in the lives of women (Schneider, 1992). One of the key 
such structural supports for battering is the lack of material resources 
available for women (Coker, 2000). Some abusive men select women 
because they are economically vulnerable (Jacobson & Gottman, 1998). 
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Even were this not the case, battering men often ensure that women 
become and remain economically vulnerable (Raphael, 1995, 1996; 
Zorza, 1991). Access to adequate housing, employment, childcare, and 
health care are important determinants of women's victimization. 
Research by Cris Sullivan finds, for example, that when advocates assist 
battered women with access to material resources and community serv-
ices, women experience less re-abuse than do women who do not 
receive the same assistance (Sullivan & Bybee, 1999). 
Transformative Justice 
Restorative justice processes do not generally address these sources of 
battered women's inequality nor do they address the subordinating sys-
tems that may operate in the life of the batterer. The concept of restora-
tion suggests that a prior state existed in which the victim experienced 
significant liberty and the offender was integrated into a community; in 
many cases neither is true (Morris, 1995). Rather than restorative jus-
tice, battered women should have the option to choose processes that 
operate with a transformative justice ideal. 
Some writers use the term transformative justice interchangeably 
with the term restorative justice (LaPrairie, 1995b; Porter, 1999), but 
Ruth Morris argues for distinguishing between the two concepts 
(Morris, 1994, 1995). Morris seeks to incorporate into justice process-
es the recognition that 'socioeconomic wrongs [are] at the root of our 
existing definitions of crime and punishment' (Morris, 1994: 290). She 
argues that while it is superior to more punitive models, restorative 
justice 'ignores structural causes of crime' (Morris, 1995: 72), which she 
understands to be 'an attempt to find power by the powerless and a neg-
ative response to pain by those in pain' (Morris, 1994: 291). She argues 
that when a crime is committed it presents an opportunity for the com-
munity to address its inequalities (Morris, 1995; see also LaPrairie, 
1995a). Additionally, Morris adds the criminal justice system as a fourth 
player to restorative justice's focus on offender, victim, and community 
(Morris, 1995). 
Morris's concept of trans formative justice suggests possibilities for 
enhancing the capacity of restorative justice processes to intervene in 
domestic violence cases. Her vision of justice recognizes the criminal 
justice system as an actor and thus offers an alternative to the manner 
in which restorative justice theory and practice elide state power and 
naturalize criminal justice processes. Morris also recognizes the impor-
tance of identifying and addressing the links between the offender's 
experiences of subordination and his offending. 
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Despite these advantages, Morris's theory presents problems for 
application in domestic violence cases. Morris's single attention to 
structural explanations for crime results in what Jack Katz (1988: 313) 
refers to as 'sentimental materialism'. This structuralist approach fails to 
recognize the importance of how people construct the experience of 
offending (Harris, 1997). If applied to domestic violence cases, Morris's 
theory fails to address the importance ofthe gendered way in which bat-
terers understand, explain, and experience their violence. Men who 
batter operate within constructs of masculinity that reinforce male dom-
inance of women. Their explanations for their violence centre on 
women's perceived failures to live up to expectations for appropriate 
women's behaviour. Their violence is often directed at reinforcing male 
privilege and control of women's sexuality. Morris's structuralist 
approach also fails to acknowledge the role of offender choice and moral 
decision-making. As Angela Harris notes, 'crime does not simply 
emerge from structures of oppression and injustice; crime is committed 
by people who consciously make choices about their actions and how 
they wish their actions to be interpreted' (Harris, 1997: 42). This failure 
to attach clear moral blame may reinforce batterers' tendencies to blame 
the victim or others for their violence. 
In addition, Morris fails to address the duality of oppression: the pow-
erless in one context are the powerful in another context (Harris, 1990). 
The result is an incomplete structural account of crime. In reality, not 
only does inequality create crime, but crime (victimization) creates and 
maintains inequality. Domestic violence creates and deepens female 
poverty (Browne, 1995), it limits women's participation in civic and 
economic life (Zorza, 1994), and it debases and devalues women's lives 
in ways that deeply affect their emotional and spiritual sense of them-
selves (West, 1999). 
An expansion of Morris's concept of transformative justice that is 
informed by feminist/critical race feminist theory would address both 
aspects of the relationship of battering to social inequality: the manner 
in which subordinating experiences in the lives of batterers relate to 
their decisions to batter and the manner in which their battering subor-
dinates women. 
This concept of transformative justice builds on research that demon-
strates that batterers' networks are important supporters of battering 
behaviour as well as on restorative justice theory that emphasizes the 
ability of supporters to care for victims and reinforce non-offending 
norms in offenders. It differs from and expands upon restorative justice 
processes in several ways. First, rather than rely on existing community 
norms, it takes as its aim the transformation and creation of com-
munities that support women's autonomy. 10 Second, it considers 
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reintegration of the batterer important but secondary to enhancing the 
victim's autonomy. 11 Third, it offers an opportunity to recognize the 
manner in which systems of oppression in the batterer's life - 'including 
economic policies that result in an inability to support families, racist 
structures, substance abuse and addiction, and histories of horrific 
childhood abuse' (Coker, 1999: 50-51) - relate to, but do not excuse, 
his use of violence. A transformative practice challenges not only the 
state's monopoly on responses to crime, but also challenges racial and 
gender subordinating institutions, beliefs, and practices that support the 
crime of battering. 
Examples of transformative processes 
Current programs that work in subordinated communlties provide 
models for a transformative justice process. These programs do not 
reject the use of coercive state power, but rely more prominently on 
changes in batterer networks, provision of support for battered women, 
and processes that link gender ideology and subordination with experi-
ences of racial subordination and colonization. These programs aspire to 
meet the transformative goals of redefining gender expectations and 
norms and building more just communities to support these changes. 
The Institute for Family Services in Somerset, New Jersey provides 
one such example (Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999). The Institute 
works with Asian Indian-American families. Some abusive men are 
court-ordered to the program while others are voluntary participants. 
The program is based on the concept that 'it is essential to dismantle the 
power dynamics connected to gender in a way that does not simultane-
ously obscure and thereby collaborate with related systems of institu-
tional oppression, such as racism and heterosexism' (Almeida & 
Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 657). Each client of the program is given a 
sponsor of the same sex whose job it is to 'connect the client to the col-
lective experience of his or her gender, racial, and cultural group' 
(Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 669). Through discussions of clips 
from movies such as Sleeping with the Enemy and Straight Out of 
Brooklyn, men in all-male 'culture groups' are encouraged to think about 
how differences of race and class affect the choices of the battered 
women in the films. The groups also encourage men to relate their own 
experiences of racism and classism to the issues of gender subordina-
tion. For example, 'one Muslim, dark-skinned Asian Indian father of 
three, who was referred for battering his partner and 12-year-old son, 
offered comprehensive ... analyses of racism ... He was challenged by 
his male peers ... to use his analysis of race to better understand their 
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requests for him to treat his female partner and his son nonviolently' 
(Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 678). 
Couples sessions occur if the victim requests them and after the per-
petrator accepts full responsibility for his abusive behaviour. These 
meetings are attended by sponsors and therapists. In one such meeting 
a man who had abused his wife and daughter read a letter in which he 
accepted responsibility for his violence. The effect was to produce in the 
wife and daughter' [feelings of] empowerment and dignity, as men and 
women they had never met unequivocally held the abuser accountable 
for his violence in a public forum' (Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 
679). The meeting was subsequently described to the man's culture 
group where ' [he] was supported by his peers for taking the first steps 
toward establishing justice in his marriage' (Almeida & Dolan-
Delvecchio, 1999: 679). The entire process became what John Braith-
waite refers to as a 'reintegrative ceremony' (Braithwaite, 1989: 102). It 
provided the batterer with the opportunity to make amends and 
acknowledge his responsibility for causing great harm to his family, 
while also reinforcing the wife and daughter's sense of dignity and moral 
worth. The process was also transformative because it reinforced the 
emerging egalitarian norms of the men's culture group and in turn the 
process in the group linked the struggle for gender equality with the 
struggle for racial and economic justice. For women, the Institute pro-
vides support without requiring that women choose between cultural 
identity or group membership and their safety and autonomy (Almeida 
& Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999). 
Other programs for heterosexual men of colour who batter similarly 
focus on relating the experiences of racial/ethnic subordination to the 
men's own use of power to subordinate their female partners (Carrillo 
& Goubaud-Reyna, 1998; Duran & Duran, 1995; Duran et aI, 1998; 
Tello, 1998; Williams, 1998). All stress that the man's own experiences 
of oppression do not excuse or justify his own oppressive behaviour. All 
seek to enable men to redefine their masculinity in ways that do not 
depend on oppressing women. These programs vary in the degree to 
which they rely on defining masculinity in a manner that is overtly 
oppositional to that of Anglo-European conceptions of masculinity. 
In Navajo peacemaking, a process similar to conferencing, some 
peacemakers use similar strategies in dealing with domestic violence 
cases. These peacemakers employ traditional Navajo stories that contain 
gender egalitarian themes (Bonvillain, 1989; Zion & Zion, 1993) to 
enlist the language of cultural and political sovereignty to create con-
ceptions of masculine identity that support gender egalitarianism 
(Coker, 1999). Peacemakers use these stories to instruct parties re-
garding their gendered responsibilities to each other, including the 
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husband's responsibility to treat his wife with respect (Coker, 1999; 
Zion & Zion, 1993). 
It is tempting to think of these processes as 'treatment' and therefore 
not 'law', but they are justice-making processes. These processes focus 
on education and organizing, not the individual psychology of the bat-
terer or the battered woman. They rest on the realization that commu-
nity is a project of political will and imagination (Harris, 1997; Kelly, 
1996). Further, while processes such as those of the Institute do not 
directly alter the ways in which racial and class subordination shape 
crime legislation or criminal justice processing, they may form the basis 
for political action to attack those inequalities. Even if this were not true, 
they enable women in those communities to live less coerced lives. 
We can also learn from justice programs that are not specifically 
focused on domestic violence. For example, Angela Harris's description 
of the work ofthe Prisoners' Alliance with Community (PAC), an infor-
mal organization operating out of Green Haven Prison in New York 
State (Harris, 1997), provides another example of transformative jus-
tice. The program operates with an Afrocentric and Latinocentric 
approach and 'places current statistics about the disproportion of 
African-American and Latino people in prison in the historical context 
of white supremacy ... ' (Harris, 1997: 43). The PAC approach 'stresses 
"empowerment" rather than "rehabilitation": transformation of the 
offender and the community rather than a simple adjustment of the 
offender to the community' (Harris, 1997: 44). Harris quotes PAC 
material: 
Inherent in the theory of rehabilitation is the concept that it seeks to 'correct' 
the individual such that it returns him or her to a state or condition that he/she 
was in, or should have been in, prior to the objectionable behavior ... [But] [t]he 
conditions for Blacks and Latinos prior to the objectionable behavior was one 
of a disadvantaged, second class citizen, in relationship to full and unobstruct-
ed access to the benefits, rewards and power in society. This lack of access clear-
ly was a factor which contributed to the objectionable behavior. (Harris, 1997: 
44) 
PAC is not only interested in coming to understand the racial subor-
dination that relates to choosing criminal behaviour, it is also interested 
in reconciliation with the community. This requires that prisoners 
acknowledge the wrongs they have committed. '[It] begin[s] with an 
apology and proceed[s] into five stages: recognition, responsibility, 
reconstruction, reconciliation, and redemption' (Harris, 1997: 44-45). 
Harris does not note whether PAC specifically addresses crimes of 
violence against women, but the PAC approach of linking offender 
responsibility to the community while at the same time recognizing the 
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injustices in the offender's life suggests the possibility for transformative 
processes that go beyond a 'program' and into the neighbourhood. 
Principles of transformative justice process 
A transformative justice project offers an alternative to the separation-
focused interventions of the dominant forms of justice intervention. It 
helps women build a community that supports women's autonomy 
without forcing women to choose between their ethnic/racial communi-
ties and safety (Coker, 2000; Presser & Gaarder, 2000). Transformative 
justice processes must avoid the trap of 'privatizing' violence, but vio-
lence is not privatized when a man reads an apology to his wife and 
daughter in the presence of others, particularly when those others are in 
a position to monitor his future behaviour. In this way, transformative 
justice processes capture the benefit available in formal adjudication: 
that of a public repudiation of the batterer's behaviour and a declaration 
of unilateral responsibility for his violence (Fenton, 1999; Schneider, 
1991) . Needless to say, facilitators in a transformative process should 
not aspire to a neutral ideal (Umbreit & Zehr, 1996) but, like Navajo 
peacemakers (Coker, 1999) should make transparent the normative 
assumptions from which they operate (Freshman, 1997). These norma-
tive assumptions should not only oppose violence, but should support 
women's autonomy. 
Contrary to some descriptions of conferencing (Retzinger & Scheff, 
1996), a transformative process for domestic violence cases should not 
focus on eliciting forgiveness from the victim. The benefits of 'reinte-
gration' for the batterer (Braithwaite, 1989) are found in enabling him 
to understand both his responsibility for his use of violence and con-
trolling behaviour and his behaviour's 'continuity with the violence of 
racial, economic, and colonizing hierarchies. Reintegration does not 
require that the victim forgive him and certainly does not require that 
they reconcile, though it does not foreclose the possibility. Pressure to 
forgive places the victim in an untenable position of once again subor-
dinating her own needs to those of the abuser. 
Further, while public apologies from the abuser are important, there 
is a danger in placing too much emphasis on an apology. Some abusive 
men are quick to apologize, but slow to change (Coker, 1999). In order 
to guard against this kind of 'cheap justice' (Coker, 1999), a transfor-
mative justice process should include extensive fact-finding, planning, 
and enforcement. The kind of fact-finding that I have in mind is similar 
to the process of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Hearings 
(Minow, 1998), to interracial justice described by Eric Yamamoto 
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(Yamamoto, 1999)12 and to the practices of some Navajo peacemakers 
(Coker, 1999; Yazzie & Zion, 1996). This fact-finding should ideally 
include the abuser's family and supporters, and at some point, the fam-
ily and supporters of the battered woman. As the work of batterers' 
treatment programs illustrates, this takes time. 
The focus in restorative justice literature on symbolic reparations is 
misplaced where the material resources available to the victim are 
directly responsible for her ongoing vulnerability to the batterer's con-
trol. Transformative justice should address the material needs of the 
victim whether through unencumbered access to crime victim compen-
sation programs (Mills, 1999) or through direct transfers of money or 
services from the abuser or his family to the victim (Braithwaite & Daly, 
1994; Zion & Zion, 1993). 
Conclusion 
Feminist critics are correct to worry that restorative justice processes 
may privatize domestic violence, creating a second rate justice that 
offers little protection for battered women. Indeed, current restorative 
justice processes seem largely inadequate to the task of addressing 
domestic violence. There are few restorative justice models that address 
the manner in which community opposition to domestic violence may 
be weak or non-existent. In addition, restorative justice literature offers 
little in the way of theory for understanding male violence against 
known women. 
Restorative justice processes frequently involve a second kind of pri-
vatization, as well. Rhetoric that highlights the power of individuals to 
address crime may serve to make invisible the manner in which state 
power is deployed to define crime and to enforce criminal laws. 
Subordinated communities are poorly served if a discussion of social 
inequalities and discriminatory criminal justice practices are 'off-limits' 
for the restorative justice process. 
Thus restorative justice processes may fail battered women because 
the particular dynamics of battering are poorly understood or because 
the process results in tacit approval of some measure of 'acceptable' 
male control of female partners. Restorative justice processes may fail 
both men and women in subordinated communities because of the fail-
ure to address their social context. 
On the other hand, current anti-domestic violence strategies that 
focus on crime control measures create real dangers for women, and this 
is particularly true for women who are most vulnerable to state intru-
sion and control. Thus, women in subordinated communities must be 
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concerned with both the coercive power of the state as well as the 
coercive power of battering men (Coker, 2001). The question is how to 
control the state - to ensure adequate protection for battered women -
without creating increased state control of women. 
Because '[w]omen live under conditions of unequal personal and 
systemic power that affect all aspects of our lives ... ' (Mahoney, 1994; 
60), we cannot presume that a singular response to domestic violence 
will be effective for all women. Rather, as Gordon Bazemore (this vol-
ume) writes, we need a 'menu of responses' to domestic violence that 
account for the structural inequalities of women's lives. 
The transformative justice model sketched here is an attempt to fur-
ther expand our 'menu'. This model addresses the structural inequali-
ties that frame the battering experience for men and women in 
subordinated communities, provides material and social support for 
battered women, and holds men who batter responsible for their vio-
lence. Adoption of a transformative process does not mean that domes-
tic violence should be decriminalized. Women must be assured that 
when police are called they will come, and that arrest takes place when 
women request arrest and the circumstances are legally sufficient for an 
arrest. But battered women risk not only that the police will fail to pro-
tect them, but that opening the door to state intervention will create 
additional sites for state control. 
Battered women require transformation: transformation of their fam-
ilies, communities, and the state. Transformative justice processes can 
link with formal justice processes (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994; Presser & 
Gaarder, 2000) and create programs that centre on this transformation. 
Notes 
1 An additional privatizing concern not often mentioned by feminist critics 
relates to the private role of restorative justice facilitators and participants. 
Facilitators are private actors in ways that are not true of judges. They are 
not subject to removal under the same conditions, their decisions are less 
likely to be subjected to public scrutiny, and to the extent that their ranks 
are more numerous and their membership less well defined, they may be 
more insulated from reform measures such as domestic violence education. 
2 The focus of state child protection agencies on the children of poor women 
of colour should be understood as part of a long history of US policies 
aimed at controlling the reproduction of poor women, particularly African-
American women (Roberts, 1997). 
3 These policies are also intended to 'shift the burden of confronting the 
abuser from the shoulders of the victim' to that of the state (Gamache & 
Asmus, 1999: 76; Hanna, 1996) and to 'hold the batterer accountable'. 
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However, 'holding accountable' may have different meanings. As Claire 
Renzetti writes, 'Could another translation of [holding batterers account-
able be] ... "failing to adequately punish men for their violence?'" (Renzetti, 
1998). Similarly, Laureen Snider suggests that feminist support for crimi-
nalizing policies confuses penality with social control (Snider, 1998). 
4 Kathryn Abrams describes 'agency' as the partial autonomy women enjoy 
under systems of oppression. (Abrams, 1999). Martha Mahoney similarly 
notes that '[a]ll work with subordinated people confronts ... the challenge of 
analyzing structures of oppression while including an account of the resist-
ance, struggles, and achievements of the oppressed' (Mahoney, 1994: 59). 
5 Many battered women desire to separate from their abuser and these 
women need assistance and protection from the state. This assistance 
should address the desperate need many women have for additional mate-
rial resources (Coker, 2000). 
6 Activists with the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, a model program 
that is often credited with the implementation of mandatory arrest and no-
drop prosecution policies in the US and elsewhere, note that without a sys-
tem-wide response that includes services and supports for victims, 
mandatory criminal policies can fail and even harm women (Pence & 
McDonnell, 1999). 
7 Hearn provides a more detailed analysis of his study in his book, The 
Violences of Men: How Men Talk About and How Agencies Respond to Men's 
Violence to "WOmen (1998a). 
8 Tracey Meares makes a similar point describing the relationship between 
social disorganization and criminal behaviour in a neighbourhood (Meares, 
1997). 
9 An additional weakness of restorative justice processes and hence much of 
the theory that flows from those processes is that the majority of practice 
and research has focussed on juvenile offenders who commit property 
crimes. The leap from this context to work with adult offenders who 
commit violent crimes recommends caution in applying current research 
conclusions to domestic violence cases. 
10 Carol LaPrairie (1995a) similarly notes that processes may be transform a-
tive because they have 'the potential for transforming communities by 
responding more realistically and effectively to community inequalities, 
needs, and conflicts'. 
11 Presser and Gaarder similarly argue for restorative justice processes that 
make '[v]ictim well-being and safety ... the first priorities' (Presser & 
Gaarder, 2000: 186). 
12 While Yamamoto describes a process in which communities of colour on 
both sides of a conflict engage in extensive fact-finding, soul-searching, 
apology and reparations, my focus is on the batterer's response (Yamamoto, 
1999). Yamamoto describes 'the four "R's'" necessary for interracial justice: 
recognition (what I refer to as fact-finding), which includes investigating 
'stock stories' that groups use to legitimate grievances against the other 
group; responsibility, which requires that the group 'assess carefully the 
dynamics of group agency for imposing disabling constraints on others'; 
reconstruction, which 'entails active steps ... toward healing the ... wounds 
resulting from disabling group constraints'; and reparation, which 'seeks to 
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repair the damage to the material conditions' and create 'material changes 
in the structure of the relationship (social, economic, political) .. .' 
(Yamamoto, 1999: 10-11). He refers to reparations without changes in 
material conditions as 'cheap reconciliation'. I adopt Yamamoto's assess-
ment and label as 'cheap justice' processes that over-value offender apolo-
gies without accompanying material changes (Coker, 1999: 85)~ 
